Central Problems of American Criminal Justice by Allen, Francis A.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 75 
Issue 5 Issues 5&6 
1977 
Central Problems of American Criminal Justice 
Francis A. Allen 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Francis A. Allen, Central Problems of American Criminal Justice, 75 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1977). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol75/iss5/3 
 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
CENTRAL PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Francis A. Allen*t 
At periodic intervals during the present century the American 
"crime problem" has aroused agitated public discussion. At these 
times both publicists and ordinary citizens are likely to assume that 
the disturbing conditions have suddenly arisen and are wholly unlike 
anything experienced before. In considering the crime problem, the 
beginning of wisdom may lie in the discovery that this is a problem 
with a history. Crime and its control did not suddenly become signif-
icant in the late 1960s, at the end of World War II, or even with the 
launching of the prohibition experiment at the conclusion of the first 
great war. On the contrary, issues of law and politics engendered by 
crime and efforts to contain it have characterized our public life since 
the beginning of the Republic. In the nineteenth century, the rest-
lessness, unruliness, and propensities to violence of American society 
impressed a succession of distinguished British visitors to our shores, 
among them Charles Dickens1 and Mrs. Frances Trollope. 2 At the 
tum of the century Joseph Conrad pictured us in even darker tones. 
In his novel, The Secret Agent, he has the nihilistic and half-mad 
manufacturer of explosives say of us: "[T]heir character is essentially 
anarchistic. Fertile ground for us, the States, very good ground. 
The great Republic has the root of the destructive matter in her. 
The collective temperament is the lawless. Excellent."3 
It is not necessary, of course, to accept quite so somber a view of 
our national character and history in order to perceive that the roots 
of what Americans call the crime problem lie deep in American 
society, and that fundamental improvements are not likely to be 
achieved cheaply or quickly. Moreover, there is abundant evidence 
that the high levels of crime we are now experiencing are likely to be 
with us well into the 1980s. Demographic -projections strongly sup-
* Edson R. Sunderland Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. A.B. 
1941, Cornell College; LL.B. 1946, Northwestern University.-Ed. 
t This essay is an adaptation of a lecture delivered as a part of the American 
Bar Association's Common Faith-Common Law Program at its 1976 Annual Meet-
ing in Atlanta. The original lecture is reprinted in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY, 
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN .APPROACHES COMPARED 361-76 (H. Jones ed. 1977). 
1. See C. DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES (1842). 
2. See F. TROLLOPE, DOMESTIC MANNER OF THE AMERICANS (1832). 
3. J. CONRAD, THE SECRET AGENT 70 (Thos. Nelson & Sons, Ltd. 1960). 
[813] 
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port this prediction. Increasing crime rates in recent years appear to 
be closely associated with increases in the number of young persons in 
our population of an age at which crimes are most frequently commit-
ted. For example, the number of males fifteen to seventeen years old 
doubled in the quarter-century following 1950. A projected decline 
in the number of persons in this age category has led some to 
anticipate an imminent reduction in crime, but closer scrutiny of these 
data suggest that the decline likely will occur most slowly in urban 
areas and among socioeconomic groups in which crime rates are 
highest.4 For the next decade and a half, therefore, there is little 
reason to expect material relief in our situation by reason of changes 
in the age characteristics of our population. 
These hard and unwelcome facts need to be remembered, for in 
this area of public policy we have proved vulnerable to panaceas and 
promises of speedy cures. This propensity has led us to accept such 
simplistic models of our problems as a war between "the peace 
forces" and "the criminal forces." Hopes raised by these and similar 
representations are doomed to disappointment, with consequent 
weakening of our self-confidence. At the same time, we are diverted 
from inquiry and measures that might lead to those modest gains that 
lie within our capacities. 
Other attitudes have hampered thought and action concerning the 
administration of criminal justice. Discussion of these matters in the 
United States is characterized by a partisanship that frequently 
trivializes the issues presented and denies depth and balance to our 
consideration. The problems of criminal justice touch upon some of 
the most important of our social concerns. Through the agencies of 
criminal justice, the most rigorous sanctions at the command of 
government are visited upon individuals. The problem of reconciling 
the exercise of law enforcement powers with the values of a democratic 
society demands a constant vigilance. The rise of the European 
dictatorships in the first half of this century clearly revealed that the 
institutions of criminal justice may be perverted into instruments for 
the systematic destruction of basic political values. 5 More recent 
disclosures stimulated by the Watergate affair demonstrate again that 
the wise containment of governmental powers devoted to criminal law 
enforcement is an essential part of the strategy of freedom. One of 
our most pressing current needs is for more effective means of 
4. Zimring, Dealing with Youth Crime: National Needs and Federal Priorities 
(1975) (unpublished paper). 
s. See F. ALLEN, THE CRIME OF POLITICS 4 (1974). 
April-May 1977] American Criminal Justice 815 
scrutinizing the activities of our police agencies, both state and na-
tional, and of ensuring that their operations advance rather than 
subvert our basic interests and values. 6 
These legitimate libertarian concerns, however, have caused some 
Americans to overlook the fact that the criminal law must, neverthe-
less, be enforced. In the last decade, crime and the fear of crime 
have become serious and deleterious factors in our national life. 
They have diminished our confidence and sense of security, caused 
economic loss and human anguish, debased the quality of our lives, 
and deformed our politics. It is remarkable how few among lawyers, 
academicians, or the public at large are able to display equal concern 
for the wise containment of the public force in the criminal process 
and for the achievement of more effective law enforcement. Partly as 
a consequence of this inability to see the whole problem we have 
failed to achieve either goal adequately. The profound and pragmatic 
men who framed the Constitution and drafted the Bill of Rights 
appear to have understood these necessities better than we. Th.ey 
aspired both to the "blessings of liberty" and to "domestic tranquil-
lity." They also understood that the one cannot be fully realized 
without the other. 
Fundamental to a system of criminal justice is the body of law 
that designates the conduct subject to criminal sanctions and defines 
the applicable penalties. One curious feature of American criminal 
justice is the insouciance with which we have treated the fundamental 
problems of crime definition. Even today, despite the significant 
revival of interest in criminal law revision inspired largely by the 
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, 7 we are much more 
likely to be absorbed in debating issues of process and procedure than 
in determining who is or ought to be deemed a criminal. This 
neglect of fundamental issues has in no way stemmed the flood of 
new criminal statutes or weakened the apparent faith of legislatures in 
criminal penalties as the solution to social proble~s that range from 
the most trivial to the most profound. The quality of the legislative 
-product, however, is often deplorable. Each year a spate of penal 
provisions is enacted containing the same easily avoidable ambiguities 
of language that have caused difficulties of interpretation for at least a 
century, and which leave in doubt such elementary matters as the 
8orts of knowledge or purpose the defendant must be found to have 
possessed before he becomes eligible for the penalties of the law. 
6. See id. at 21-22, 68-71. 
7. (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). 
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Reruns of regulatory enactments can be scrutinized without discover-
ing evidence of any consideration of the appropriateness of criminal 
penalties to the legislative purpose or the relative efficacy of such 
penalties when compared to the wide range of noncriminal sanctions 
available to the law. 8 Nor, in all candor, can it be said that American 
courts have done much better. American judicial opinions dealing 
with the substantive criminal law do not, in general, constitute a 
distinguished judicial literature, or one that can be compared favor-
ably with that of courts in several other nations whose law is also 
derived from English sources.0 No doubt, responsibility for this 
situation resides to some degree in the law schools. The time has 
long passed since the basic criminal law course was routinely assigned 
to the youngest and most vulnerable member of the faculty or to that 
colleague suspected of mild brain damage and hence incompetent to 
deal with courses that really matter. Nevertheless, it is true that 
there are faculties of some distinguished American law schools that 
only grudgingly tolerate courses in the substantive criminal law and 
that remain to be convinced of the subject's real importance. 
The question of who should be deemed criminal in our society is 
too insistent, however, to be wholly suppressed. Perhaps one of the 
incidental gains that may be derived from the acrimonious controversy 
surrounding the proposals for the recodification of the federal 
criminal law, contained in the bill known as S. l, is the demonstration 
that important interests and values may be strongly affected by the 
contents of a criminal code.10 
One of the principal issues of legal policy in our time is that of 
decriminalization, a progrrun more frequently discussed than 
achieved.11 For at least a generation it has been clear that the system 
of criminal justice is seriously overburdened with responsibilities that 
would be better performed by agencies other than the criminal law, or 
perhaps not performed at all. In many instances, attempts to enforce 
such criminal prohibitions, especially sumptuary regulations concern-
s. Allen, Book Review, 66 YALE L.J. 1120, 1121-22 (1957), 
9. For a discussion of these problems in so far as they involve the Supreme Court 
of the United States, see Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CoNTEMP, 
PROB. 401 (1958); Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP, Cr. REV, 
107. 
10. S.1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
11. There is a substantial literature on this issue. See F. ALLEN, THE BORDER· 
LAND OF CRIMINAL JUSilCE (1964); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 
(1963); N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLlTICJAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME 
CONTROL (1970); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF TIIE CRIMINAL SANcrION (1968); 
Junker, Criminalization and Criminogenesis, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 697 (1972); 
Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 1 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 17 (1968); Skolnick, 
Coercion to Virtue: The Enforcement of Morals, 41 S. CAL. L. REV, 588 (1968), 
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ing gambling, adult sexual behavior, and the consumption of alcohol 
and certain other drugs, are clearly not worth the candle. The 
consequences of such efforts are to encourage police practices that 
impinge upon constitutionally protected areas of privacy, that divert 
the limited resources of law enforcement from the tasks it can uniquely 
perform, and that exacerbate the alienation of significantly large 
groups in the population from the law and the institutions of justice. 
Continuation of our efforts to impose an official version of propriety 
in these areas will probably fail, and at great cost. But the costs of 
success would likely be higher, for success would entail the use of 
governmental coercion on a scale threatening to our basic political 
values. We face a period in which the only kind of free society likely 
to be attainable is one in which the law must show a broader 
tolerance than ever before for diversity in interpersonal relations, 
ethical preferences, and private conduct.12 This is a more serious 
prospect than advocates of decriminalization have sometimes per-
ceived, for the consequence in some cases is to broaden the gap 
between private moral convictions and the policy of the law.13 But if 
it is a serious matter to deny the coercive sanctions of the law to 
enforce the sincerely held moral sentiments of certain groups, it is 
even more serious to impose coercive sanctions on persons for 
conduct sincerely held by them to be morally required or within the 
protected ambit of individual choice. The abortion controversy illus-
trates the dilemmas that must be encountered and resolved by the law 
in an increasingly pluralistic society. 
The year 1968 marked the end of the Warren Court, and with it 
the end of an extraordinary experiment in the uses of judicial power 
to alter significantly the nature of American criminal justice in the 
interest of a more complete realization of the constitutional com-
mands. How the achievement of the Warren Court is to be evaluated 
remains very much a matter of contention even nine years later. 
Whatever the ultimate judgments may be, it seems clear that because 
of the Warren Court we see many problems today in ways not 
perceived before, and that however far other courts may depart from 
that Court's precedents, we shall not return to the status quo ante. It 
is likely that the lasting contribution of the Warren Court will prove 
to be less its solutions to the problems addressed, and more its 
identification of the problems requiring solution and its ethical im-
pulse. The very failures of the Warren Court to modify certain 
12. See F. ALLEN, supra note 5, at 72-74. 
13. Cf. Levi, The Collective Morality of a Maturing Society, 30 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 399 (1973). 
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obdurate features of our system through the application of judicial 
power may be of value in underscoring the point that fundamental 
reform cannot be achieved by the Supreme Court alone, but requires 
the full and intelligent cooperation of the legislative branch.14 It also 
requires the impetus given by such contributions as the Standards for 
Criminal Justice of the American Bar Association, 15 and the work of 
the American Law Institute16 and the National Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws.17 
Important as the Warren Court's concerns were, however, they 
encompassed only a small segment of the critical problems confront-
ing the administration of criminal justice in the modem era. Indeed, 
in fashioning procedures that necessarily require greater expenditures 
of time and personnel, the Warren Court in some degree exacerbated 
the systemic malfunctions of criminal justice administration. This is 
not to argue that the Warren Court could conscientiously have ig-
nored the great issues of decency and equity that it addressed. Yet 
criminal justice reform that fails to concern itself with the totality of 
the system's operation is likely to produce results that are partial and 
unsatisfactory. Most reform efforts in this century have been of this 
character, and there continues to be an insufficient awareness within 
the legal profession or the public at large that we face a crisis in the 
administration of criminal justice that threatens the imminent break-
down of the system. 
In the report of the American Bar Association's Special Commit-
tee on the Administration of Justice issued almost a quarter century 
ago, Justice Robert H. Jackson observed: "There is widespread doubt 
that existing criminal procedures can be relied upon either adequately 
to protect society or to protect the individual accused. "18 In the 
intervening years, the doubt that Justice Jackson expressed in 1953 
has deepened into near certainty. The causes of the present crisis are 
many and imperfectly understood, but the essence of the matter is 
clear enough. The American system of criminal justice is confronted 
by quantitative demands that exceed the capacities of its resources 
and procedures. The administration of criminal justice groans under 
a stifling and increasing weight of numbers-numbers of offenses, of 
14. I have dealt more fully with these matters in Allen, The Judicial Quest for 
Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases 1975 U. ILL, L.F. 518. 
15. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1973 ). 
16. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (1975). 
17. NATIONAL CoMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM RULES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1974). 
18. Criminal Justice: The Vital Problem of the Future, 39 A.B.A.J. 743 (1953), 
quoted in L.R. KATZ, JusnCE Is nm CRIME 1 (1972). 
April-May 1977] American Criminal Justice 819 
accused persons, and of convicted offenders. Accommodations made 
by the system to the exigent quantitative demands put upon it have 
resulted in practices directed principally to the processing of increas-
ing numbers of persons as an end in itself-practices that bear only 
incidental relation to justice for the individual caught up in the system 
or to the adequate protection of the community. 
The American system of criminal justice is not a system of trial by 
jury but one directed to the obtaining of guilty pleas. In many 
jurisdictions guilty pleas are obtained in as many as ninety per cent of 
the cases. Because a significant decrease in the percentages would 
create demands for resources and personnel to which the existing 
system could not possibly respond, every effort is made to maintain 
the number of guilty pleas at high levels, and this objective prevails 
over every other competing goal.111 The result in most urban jurisdic-
tions is a system of compromise, barter, and bargain that, although 
susceptible to manipulation in some instances by the government and 
in others by the defendant, fails in general to advance the legitimate 
interests of either the community or the defense. 
The havoc wreaked on important social interests by such mal-
functioning of the criminal justice system is not susceptible to accu-
rate estimate. Perhaps the most serious losses are to the integrity and 
credibility of the law and its institutions. The operation of the system 
diverges seriously from its intended purposes; it pursues objectives 
rarely acknowledged and relegates to secondary importance the objec-
tives it is supposed to fulfill. The result is a process permeated by 
pretense and camouflage, and the influence of these tendencies is 
discernible even in the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States.20 
These pathologies are no secret to the many capable persons who 
participate in the administration of American criminal justice or who 
have systematically observed its operations. As a result of the dedi-
cated efforts of these persons, progress, however halting, is being 
made to alleviate some of the serious malfunctions. Yet efforts at 
reform produce their own perils, and here, as in other attempts to 
modify the operation of human institutions, we must face the specter 
of unintended consequences. One of the fatal errors often committed 
19. There is an extensive literature on this subject. See Alschuler, The Prosecu-
tor's Rule in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968). _See also D. NEWMAN, 
CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 
(1966). 
20. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 
397 U.S. 790 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). See generally 
Alschuler, The Supreme Court, The Defense Attorney, and the Guilty Plea, 41 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1 (1975). 
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in reform movements is the failure to perceive the interrelatedness of 
the entire criminal process and therefore to overlook the effect that 
changes in one stage of the process produce in the operation of others. 
Thus, in recent months proposals have been advanced for a sweeping 
program of mandatory minimum sentences, often apparently without 
calculation of, on the one hand, how such a program may be frustrated 
by plea bargaining in the pretrial stages of the process, or, on the 
other, how the already intolerable conditions of overcrowding in our 
correctional institutions may be aggravated by substantial increases in 
the prison population. 
Another error that sometimes diminishes the effectiveness of re-
form is a tendency to rely on improved managerial principles when 
the basic problem is an absolute deficiency in the resources of person-
nel and money available to the system. Programs limited to read-
justments of procedures may make it easier for legislatures to evade 
the hard but necessary decisions to increase the allocation of resources 
to the criminal justice system. It is possible that experience with the 
new federal speedy-trial legislation may illustrate this point. 21 To 
recount these problems, of course, is not to question the importance 
of improved managerial principles, the increased utilization of com-
puter and other electronic technology, or the modification of histori-
cal procedures that were created to meet requirements wholly differ-
ent from those of the twentieth-century world. What is urged is that 
the indispensable movement to reform must be more broadly based 
and carefully calculated than ever before, and that it must be accom-
panied by a resolve to bear the costs that a proper performance of the 
justice function entails. 
Accompanying the crisis in the administration of criminal justice 
are other issues of at least equal importance. Occasionally, funda-
mental theoretical questions long mooted in academic circles suddenly 
became of the most pressing practical concern. This is now occur-
ring in the area of criminal justice. Serious consideration is being 
given to the purposes of the criminal law and the ways in which these 
purposes may best be realized. A time when fundamental issues are 
raised is one of great opportunities, yet it is also one of great peril. 
For the larger part of the present century, the attitudes of most 
professionals in the fields of theoretical and applied criminology were 
dominated by what on an earlier occasion I described as the "rehabili-
tative ideal." The concept of deserved punishment was rejected as 
unscientific and inhumane. The possibilities of deterring dangerous 
behavior were greeted with profound skepticism and denied serious 
21. See Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3161-3174 (Supp. 1976). 
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consideration. The sanctions of the criminal law were seen as 
providing opportunities for modifying the behavior of offenders in the 
interests of both social defense and the happiness, health, and satis-
factions of the individual offender. Most of the reforms undertaken in 
the present century were expressions of the rehabilitative ideal, such 
as systems of parole and probation, the juvenile court, and psychiatric 
counseling. 22 Although public attitudes were less strongly and con-
sistently committed to the rehabilitative ideal than those of the profes-
sionals, the notions of rehabilitation and reform of criminals often 
found sympathetic response in the general public. 
The case against the rehabilitative ideal was first seriously under-
taken in the years immediately following World War II. The indict-
ment contained many counts. It was observed, first, that talk about 
rehabilitation frequently served as a cosmetic to disguise ugly realities 
in penal institutions that aggravate rather than cure criminality. It 
was noted, also, that the application of the rehabilitative ideal resulted 
in the exercise of broad discretion by judges and correctional person-
nel, a discretion affecting basic human concerns, but largely free of 
meaningful legal standards and therefore frequently abused. 23 But 
more important than any of these concerns was the growing percep-
tion that rehabilitative measures do not work, that after decades of 
experimentation there exists no validated scientific evidence of the 
capacity of rehabilitative programs to reduce criminal recidivism. 24 
The case against the rehabilitative ideal has achieved spectacular 
success. Rarely has there been so precipitous and complete a reversal 
of professional opinion. Today the talk is of deterrence and incapac-
itation: the law's promises to inflict punishment on those who 
violate it must be kept. Sentences should be fixed and not subject to 
the discretion of -parole boards; in many cases minimum sentences of 
imprisonment are to be mandatory. Persons who demonstrate dan-
gerous propensities to violence should be subjected to long terms of 
incarceration. The concept of deserved punishment is to be refur-
bished and pressed into service. 25 
Many of the measures associated with the new mood deserve a 
trial, and, in any event, their widespread adoption appears inevitable. 
But every posture taken toward social problems contains its own 
22. These matters are discussed in greater detail in F. ALLEN, supra note 11, at 
25-41. ' 
23. Id. at 32-35. 
24. Perhaps the most influential modern statement of this point is Martinson, 
What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 THE PuBLic IN-
TEREST 22 (Spring 1974). 
25. Among the most responsible modern discussions of many of these themes is 
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distinctive forms of pathology. One suspects that we shall need to be 
strongly on our guard to prevent the new emphasis on deterrence and 
incapacitation from degenerating into a regime of harsh and insensi-
tive repression. However imperfectly the rehabilitative idea was 
expressed in practice, it at least focused attention on the individual 
offender as a human being entitled to the concern and compassion 
of the community. Wars on crime breed war psychoses, and social 
action taken in the heat of such excitement has a way of proving 
self-defeating. 
Moreover, if we turn away from the rehabilitative ideal because it 
does not work, what shall our stance be toward other measures that 
may succeed in modifying aggressive human behavior into more 
placid and malleable forms? To what ends shall we use aversion 
therapy, psychosurgery, behavior-modifying drugs? Our response 
cannot be a Luddite rejection of all new knowledge in these fields. 
But we are in urgent need of principles delineating areas of human 
personality and autonomy inviolate from the scalpel and the syringe. 26 
Recently I received a letter from a brilliant and perceptive investi-
gator who place in juxtaposition two sets of facts derived from his 
ongoing inquiry. The first is that one-half of all felony arrests for 
robbery and burglary in New York City are of teen-agers, and the 
probability of a New York teen-ager being arrested for a felony in any 
one year is seven per cent. The other set of facts is that the daily 
attendance rate in the New York public schools is sixty-five per cent, 
and in the ghetto schools it is around fifty per cent. 27 What is to be 
done about this relentless production of young criminals? What is 
there in our culture and institutions that permits this to occur? In 
candor, we are no closer to secure answers to these questions than we 
were at the turn of the century when the study of crime causation was 
first placed on a systematic basis. Yet in our preoccupation with 
legislation, administration, and crime repression, we need to keep 
alive our concern about a society that breeds such massive expressions 
of aggression and violence. In short, in the field of criminal justice 
we need to respond to our consciences and compassion, as well as to 
our fears. It seems not too much to say that the quality of our 
response is important, not only to the administration of justice, but 
also to the realization of our most basic values. 
N. MORRIS, THE F'uTuRE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974). See J. WILSON, THINKING 
ABOUT CRIME (1975). 
26. See Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the 
Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 237 (1974). 
27. Letter from Professor Hans Zeise! to Francis A. Allen (Feb. 25, 1976). 
